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How WOULD

OR SHOULD THE SUPREME COURT

INTERPRET THE DEFINITIONS IN RULE 801?
MargaretA. Berger*
The stated purpose of this forum is to consider the status of implied assertions
under the Federal Rules of Evidence, using the House of Lords' opinion in
Regina v. Kearley' as a springboard for analysis. This inquiry leads to a question
that has broader implications for the law of evidence: How should the federal
courts go about interpreting a Rule of Evidence? This Essay first discusses
briefly the history of implied assertions, and then turns to two recent opinions of
the Supreme Court, Williamson v. United States2 and Tome v. United States,' in
which the Court considered interpretive issues in connection with other provisions of the hearsay rule.
In the United States, as in the British Commonwealth, the starting point for any
discussion of implied assertions is the House of Lords' 1837 opinion in the celebrated will contest known as Wright v. Tatham.4 The evidence at issue consisted
of several letters written to the testator by persons now deceased, including two
clergymen. 5 One thanked for past favors and the other requested that the recipient's lawyer take legal action.' Other letters were from relatives reporting on
trips and other events.7 The theory underlying the offer of these letters was that
the writers would not have written as they did unless they believed the testator to
be competent - the central contested issue. 8 The judges found that the letters
constituted hearsay; that they stood on the same footing as an explicit declaration
by the writers about the testator's sanity.'
In dictum, the Tatham judges explored hypothetical instances of nonverbal
conduct which they concluded would also be barred by the hearsay rule: payment of an insurance policy as proof of the loss of the insured ship; payment of a
wager as proof of the happening of the event which was the subject of the wager;
precautions taken by a family to show that the person involved was a lunatic; and
the famous example of the sea captain who after inspecting a ship embarked with
his family as proof of the seaworthiness of the vessel."0
The analysis in Tatham supported a definition of hearsay that swept within its
ambit evidence of any out-of-court behavior, whether verbal or nonverbal, whenever relevancy hinges on an assessment of the declarant's credibility. The discus-

* Professor of Law, Brooklyn Law School.
1. 2 App. Cas. 228 (H.L. Eng. 1992).
2. 114 S.Ct. 2431 (1994).
3. 115 S.Ct. 696 (1995).
4. 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (K.B. 1837).
5. Id. at 488-89.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 490-91.
8. Id. at 488.
9. Id.
10. See, e.g., id. at 516.
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sion in Tatham indicated clearly that the judges did not view the lessened danger
of insincerity as altering the prohibition against admitting evidence not given
under oath or subject to cross-examination. 1 They found that the hearsay rule
barred the letters because the declarants' failure to testify meant that the jurors
would not be apprised fully of the circumstances on which the declarants' conclusions were based. 2 Given this conclusion in Tatham and the House of Lords'
holding in Myers v. Director of Public Prosecutions13 that "no further judicial
development of the law of hearsay was permissible,"' 4 it is not surprising that a
majority in Kearley found that the evidence of verbal and nonverbal conduct
5
admitted at trial ought to have been excluded as hearsay.,
Very different issues emerge when we turn to the Federal Rules of Evidence.
The guiding principle embodied in the Federal Rules of Evidence is that the
Rules' paramount truth-finding function is more likely to be achieved if the trier
of fact has liberal access to relevant evidence. Hearsay obviously often has considerable probative value; an out-of-court statement by a declarant who speaks
truthfully and unambiguously and who perceives and remembers accurately may
be at least as helpful to the trier of fact in ascertaining the truth as some in-court
testimony. Consequently, the Advisory Committee did not approve of a broad
definition of hearsay that would deprive jurors of highly probative and reliable
evidence whose equivalent might not be obtainable.
The Advisory Committee's solution was to limit the potential sweep of the
hearsay concept through the definitional sections of Federal Rule 801.16 Central
to this design is the distinction between assertive and non-assertive behavior.
Only a "statement" can constitute hearsay. 7 Verbal conduct is a "statement"
when it constitutes "an oral or written assertion" and "nonverbal conduct of a
person" constitutes a statement only "if it is intended by the person as an assertion."' 8 Furthermore, according to Rule 801(c), a statement constitutes hearsay
only when it is offered "to prove the truth of the matter asserted," so that an
assertion implied from an assertion is also classified as non-hearsay. 9
Although this concept of "assertion" is the linch-pin of the Advisory
Committee's objective to limit the scope of the hearsay doctrine, the Rules and
the notes do not provide a definition of the term. The notes, however, tell us
what the Advisory Committee was seeking to achieve - to exclude from the
hearsay category evidence that poses a very low risk of fabrication. The Note to
Federal Rule 801(a) explains:

11. Wright v. Tatham, 7 Eng. Rep. 559, 566 (K.B. 1838) (Coleridge) ("Nor does the rule vary because the
remoteness of the period, and the absence of any dispute on the matter at the time, put aside all suspicion of
insincerity.").
12. Id.
13. 2All E.R. 881 (1964).
14. Regina v. Kearley, 2 App. Cas. 228, 237 (H.L. Eng. 1992) (citing Myers v. Director of Pub. Prosecutions,
1965 App. Cas. 1001).
15. Id. at 228.
16. Congress made no changes in these sections.
17. FED. R. EvD. 801(c).
18. FED. R. EviD. 801(a).
19. FED. R. Evtn. 801(c).
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[N]onverbal conduct [not the equivalent of words], however, may be offered as
evidence that the person acted as he did because of his belief in the existence of
the condition sought to be proved, from which belief the existence of the condition may be inferred.... Admittedly evidence of this character is untested with
respect to the perception, memory, and narration (or their equivalent) of the
actor, but the Advisory Committee is of the view that these dangers are minimal
in the absence of an intent to assert and do not justify the loss of evidence on
hearsay grounds. No class of evidence is free of the possibility of fabrication,
but the likelihood is less with nonverbal than with assertive verbal conduct. The
situations giving rise to the nonverbal conduct are such as virtually to eliminate
questions of sincerity. . . . Similar considerations govern nonassertive verbal
conduct and verbal conduct which is assertive but offered as a basis for inferring
excluded from the definition of
something other than the matter asserted, 2also
0
hearsay by the language of subdivision (c).
The letters and the hypotheticals discussed in Tatham both fall into a low risk
of fabrication category. The danger of insincerity is minimal when evidence is
offered of the declarants' acts in order to prove their underlying beliefs; sincerity
is guaranteed by the cost to the declarant if he or she were mistaken, as the ship
captain and insurer examples in Tatham vividly illustrate. In addition, even with
regard to the letters, the circumstances of their nature and timing make it highly
improbable that the senders were deliberately seeking to express misleading
information about the recipient's mental capacity rather than conveying thanks
and tidings about their daily affairs.
Although hearsay dangers other than fabrication might exist, these dangers are
clearly less in the case of nonverbal conduct because the sea captain or any other
actor is likely to verify the accuracy of underlying perceptions and memory and
to clarify any ambiguities before taking costly actions. The Advisory Committee
did not explain why the lessened danger of fabrication would minimize other
hearsay concerns in the case of verbal conduct - after all declarants, though sincere, might be mistaken in their perceptions or memories. In Tatham, the family
members and clergymen, who were in a position to check on the mental competence of their correspondent, probably would not have wasted their time in writing to an incompetent; therefore the underlying belief being implied is likely to
be accurate. In other instances of implied assertions, however, it is more difficult
to see why the absence of insincerity would enhance other components of a
declarant's credibility.2 Perhaps the Committee thought not that other hearsay

20. FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee's note.
21. For instance, in Rex v. Wysochan, 54 C.C.C. 172 (Sask. Ct. App. 1930), a woman was fatally shot in the
presence of her husband and another man. The other man was charged with the murder, but claimed that the
husband did it. Before she died, the victim made two statements in which she said to her husband: "Help me."
These were introduced at trial. Even if we assume that the statements were sincere - that she would not have
asked her husband for help if he had indeed shot her - we have no way of knowing if she perceived who shot
her, or if her imminent death affected her memory. The ambiguity of the statements also make it difficult to
assess sincerity.
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dangers would be minimized but rather that the risk to the judicial system would
be less. It may have assumed that although the trier needs to see the demeanor of
a declarant in order to detect fabrication, evidence and argumentation can adequately apprise jurors of the other hazards that affect credibility which must be
considered in evaluating the worth of an implied assertion. Furthermore, the
Federal Rules contain Rule 403 which a judge might use to exclude evidence that
was particularly untrustworthy.
Deciding how the different items of evidence in Kearley should be treated
under the Federal Rules is, however, considerably more difficult than dealing
with the real and hypothetical facts of Tatham. Instead of a tidy category of nonverbal conduct, we have a mixture of verbal and nonverbal conduct in Kearley.
The declarants acted - they telephoned the defendant's home and came to his
door - but proof that the telephone and doorbell rang while the police were
searching the premises would be irrelevant without some proof of what the
declarants said.
Undoubtedly, the risk of insincerity is low with regard to both the phone calls
and the statements made in person. Why would anyone send messages to the
defendant's own home to deliberately and falsely imply that defendant is
involved in the sale of drugs? Only a clairvoyant would know that the police
would hear this fabrication because they were presently on the premises. On the
other hand, other assumptions embedded in the Advisory Committee's Note are
more questionable. When the declarant is a first-time would-be purchaser who
has not performed any act more costly than making a phone call or traveling to
defendant's house, can one plausibly argue that the other hearsay dangers are
minimized because the declarant would not have acted without checking out
inaccuracies in perception, memory, and narration? The declarant's phoning or
arriving to ask, "Are there drugs for sale?" may in fact constitute the very
process by which he or she is verifying a rumor that defendant sells drugs. In a
criminal case, should the defendant have to bear the risk of the mistaken, deluded, misinformed, or enigmatic declarant just because the likelihood of fabrication
is low?
And to what extent, if at all, does it matter what the Advisory' Committee
intended? Two recent opinions of the Supreme Court that deal with the hearsay
rule suggest that the significance of the drafters' intentions is an issue on which
members of the Court may differ, and that there may be a number of different
routes by which to find the meaning of the existing hearsay rules.22
In Williamson v. United States,2" six Justices construed the word "statement" in
Federal Rule 801(a)(1) in the course of determining whether collateral statements in a declaration against penal interest are admissible.24 Justice O'Connor's
opinion, after looking at definitions in Webster's Dictionary, concluded that

22. See Williamson v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2431 (1994); Tome v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 696 (1995).
23. 114 S. Ct. 2431 (1994).
24. Id. at 2432.
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"statement" could have a number of possible meanings and that "the text of the
Rule does not directly resolve the matter."2 She found, however, that a narrow
definition was indicated if one looked at "the principle behind the rule"26 which
is that hearsay statements must be reliable in order to be admissible.2 7
Furthermore, she concluded that "the policy expressed in the statutory text points
clearly enough in one direction that it outweighs whatever force the Notes [of the
Advisory Committee] may have."28 In contrast, the dissenting opinion of Justice
Kennedy, joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas, after noting the
silence of Rule 804(b)(3) with regard to collateral statements, looked at the
Advisory Committee's Note and common law practice in order to determine the
Rule's meaning.2 9
In an even more recent hearsay opinion, Tome v. United States,3" the Supreme
Court had to determine how the timing of a prior consistent statement affects
admissibility under Rule 801(d)(1)(B). Justice Kennedy, now writing for the
majority, concluded that the language of the rule was "intended to carry over the
common-law ... rule," and that this reading of Rule 801 (d)(1)(B) "is confirmed

by an examination of the Advisory Committee Notes."3 1 Justices Stevens,
Souter, and Ginsburg, who were also in the majority in Williamson, joined in
praising the "Notes as a useful guide in ascertaining the meaning of the Rules,"
and in finding it unlikely that the Advisory Committee would havte scuttled a
common law requirement "without so much as a whisper of explanation."32
The four dissenters, on the other hand, in an opinion by Justice Breyer, who
was not yet on the Court when Williamson was decided, did not rely on the
Advisory Committee's Note at all. Instead, the dissenting opinion concluded that
"because the Rule addresses a hearsay problem and one can find a reason ...for
why it does so, I would read the Rule's plain words to mean exactly what they
say."33 Justice Scalia, however, disagreed with the dissent's conclusion about the
Rule's plain words and joined in the judgment of the majority. 4 Although he
insisted that "the promulgated Rule says what it says, regardless of the intent of
its drafters," he maintained that in order to interpret the Rule" 'the body of com-

25. Id.at 2435.
26. Id.
27. Id. 'Nothing in the text of Rule 804(b)(3) or the general theory of the hearsay Rules suggests that admissibility should turn on whether a statement is collateral to a self-inculpatory statement. The fact that a statement
is self-inculpatory does make it more reliable; but the fact that a statement is collateral to a self-inculpatory
statement says nothing at all about the collateral statement's reliability." Id. Justice Ginsburg's concurring opinion, in which Justices Stevens, Souter, and Blackmun join, finds that all of the declarant's statements should
have been excluded because they cannot be ranked as trustworthy. Id. at 2439. Justices O'Connor and Scalia
were willing to remand in order for the court below to consider separately whether each part of declarant's
remarks was sufficiently against interest to be reliable. Id. at 2437-38.
28. Id. at 2436.
29. Id. at 2442-43. It concluded that the Advisory Committee's Note and practice pointed to admitting some
collateral statements.
30. 115 S. Ct. 696(1995).
31. Id. at 702.
32. Id. at 702-03.
33. Id. at 708.
34. Id. at 706.
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mon law knowledge' must be a 'source of guidance.' "" Consequently he found
the meaning of Rule 801(d)(1)(B) must be consistent with its interpretation at
36
common law because the language of the Rule tracks common-law cases. Most
of his concurring opinion is devoted to explaining why drafters' notes are not
authoritative.
What do these opinions tell us about how to construe the word "assertion" in
Rule 801? Must one look only to the dictionary meaning, or may one also examine the policy underlying the hearsay rule, the language informed by its common
law usage, or the Notes of the drafters? If the dictionary meaning controls,
regardless of policy or history, then the evidence in Kearley is undoubtedly
admissible as not constituting a "statement" under Rule 801. And, indeed, the
lower federal courts have admitted evidence of telephone calls intercepted by the
police while searching for drugs or betting paraphernalia. 7 In these cases the
courts have used a dictionary approach to plain-meaning to conclude that an
"assertion" "has the connotation of a positive declaration" that does not cover
inquiries about obtaining drugs or placing bets. 8
But do the Supreme Court's opinions in Williamson and Tome mandate this
result? In Williamson the six Justices who consult Webster's make statements
about the policy of the hearsay rule that are somewhat at odds with the construction of the hearsay rule that results if Webster's definition of "assertion" is
used.3 9 Before the opinion even mentions Webster's it states that the premise of
the hearsay rule is "that out-of-court statements are subject to particular hazards.
The declarant might be lying; he might have misperceived the events which he
relates; he might have faulty memory; his words might be misunderstood or
taken out of context by this listener."4 Nothing in this recitation suggests that
there is no need for a hearsay rule when the danger of insincerity is low. Indeed,
the opinion goes on to state that "the Federal Rules of Evidence also recognize
that some kinds of out-of-court statements are less subject to these hearsay dangers, and therefore except them from the general rule that hearsay is inadmissible."41
Would these Justices countenance a definition of hearsay that would classify
evidence as nonhearsay even if the declarant "might have misperceived the
events he relates" or his words "might be ...taken out of context by the listen-

35. Id. Justice Scalia is quoting from the Court's opinion in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.,
113 S. Ct. 2786, 2794 (1993) (construing Federal Rule 702 on expert testimony), which in turn quoted from
United States v. Abel, 469 U.S. 45, 52 (1984) (examining the status of impeachment by bias under the Federal
Rules) which quoted from Edward W Cleary, PreliminaryNotes on Reading the Rules of Evidence, 57 NEB. L.
REv.908, 915 (1978) (the Reporter to the original Advisory Committee that drafted Rule 801 and its accompanying note).
36. Id.
37. See, e.g., United States v. Oguns, 921 E2d 442, 448-49 (2d Cir. 1990); United States v. Long, 905 F.2d
1572, 1579-80 (D.C. Cir. 1990); United States v. Zenni, 492 E Supp. 464 (E.D. Ky. 1980).
38. Oguns, 921 F.2d at 448-49; Long, 905 E2d at 1579-80; Zenni, 492 F.Supp. at 468.
39. Williamson v. United States, 114 S.Ct. 2431, 2434 (1994).
40. Id.
41. Id. (emphasis added).
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er?"42 Ironically, it is Justice Scalia, usually labeled as the prime proponent of
plain-meaning, whose opinion in Tome indicates that he might be the most influenced by the common law's failure to differentiate the danger of insincerity from
other hearsay dangers, as we know from Tatham. Furthermore, he would obviously view the Advisory Committee's Note in a very different light than Justice
Kennedy who in both Williamson and Tome indicates a willingness to consider
the Advisory Committee's Note as the authoritative guide to the meaning of a
Rule. Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice Thomas looked to the drafters' intent
in Williamson though not in Tome, and Justices Ginsburg, Souter, and Stevens
endorse the Notes "as a useful guide" in Tome, although they agree with Justice
O'Connor in Williamson that when "the policy expressed in the statutory text
points clearly enough in one direction that it outweighs whatever force the Notes
may have."4 This brings us full circle to whether a dictionary definition controls
in ascertaining the policy expressed in the text of Rule 801.
It would certainly be possible to adopt a definition of "assertion" that would
further the common law policy that all hearsay dangers pose unacceptable risks
instead of singling out insincerity as the only danger to avoid. Such a definition
would exclude from the hearsay category those statements that are less subject to
ambiguity, misperception, faulty memory, and fabrication. Such an interpretation
of "assertion" more consonant with the common law design would focus on what
the declarant was seeking to communicate. The result would be to label the
declarant's statement as hearsay when it is used to prove what the declarant
sought to communicate. Under this definition the evidence in Tatham is still nonassertive, just as when a dictionary definition is used, because the declarants' are
not communicating about their correspondent's sanity. The evidence in Kearley,
however, would constitute hearsay because the declarants' statements clearly convey that they want the defendant to sell them narcotics.
Classifying the statements in Kearley as hearsay has two desirable consequences. First, although unreliable evidence would be excluded, trustworthy evidence could still be admitted. Under the Federal Rules, but not in England, a
judge could admit any statement that is particularly trustworthy because of low
hearsay risks pursuant to Rule 804(b)(5)'s residual exception. A statement inquiring for the defendant by his nickname, and requesting the same amount of drugs
declarant regularly buys is not ambiguous, and is unlikely to be insincere or the
product of an inaccurate perception or memory. There is little danger with such a
statement that the declarant was trying to check on a rumor about the defendant

42. For instance, in United States v. Oguns, 921 E2d 442 (2d Cir. 1990), where the police, as in Kearley,
intercepted a telephone call while searching defendant's premises for narcotics, the caller asked to speak to the
defendant and then asked "Have the apples arrived there?" Id. at 445. The declarant may be mistaken in thinking that defendant has drugs for sale; he may even be inquiring about apples. The court's conclusion that the
evidence was admissible because " '[a]n inquiry is not an assertion,' " seems particularly suspect in a case in
which the court permitted the government to introduce expert testimony about narcotic traffickers use of code
words during telephone conversations about drugs. Id. at 449 (quoting Inc. Pub. Corp. v. Manhattan Magazine,
Inc., 616 E Supp. 370, 388 (S.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 788 E2d 3 (2d Cir. 1986).
43. Williamson, 114 S. Ct. at 2436.
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which may be false, confused defendant's name with someone else's, or called a
wrong number.
In Kearley, the judges could find no principle that would enable items of evidence individually inadmissible to acquire by association with one another a
quality of cumulative admissibility that they did not possess individually."'
Under the residual exception, however, a judge could take into account that all
the statements made during the numerous phone calls and visits were consistent,
and that some of them, as indicated above, posed few hearsay dangers.
Furthermore, on the facts of Kearley, the great unlikelihood that so many statements would implicate defendant as the source of drugs unless they were true
should suffice to establish "circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness."4 The
Federal Rules of Evidence are far more pragmatic than their British counterparts.
Classifying evidence such as that introduced in Kearley as hearsay has another
valuable consequence as well. It means that the Confrontation Clause applies.4" I
have argued elsewhere for an interpretation that would bar hearsay statements
elicited by governmental agents unless the declarant is produced at trial or special procedures are followed.47 I have just enough space left to suggest that the
police should perhaps be required to tape the messages they intercept in cases
like Kearley or to demonstrate that a reasonable effort was made by the prosecution to secure the declarant as a witness. The high potential for the declarant's
absence at trial suggests the desirability of prophylactic rules that would enable
the jurors to better assess the circumstances and contents of the out-of-court
statements.

44. See, e.g., 2 App. Cas. 228, 273 (1992) (Oliver).
45. FED. R. EvID. 804(b)(5).
46. In Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985), the Court held that the use of a statement in its nonhearsay aspect "raises no Confrontation Clause concerns."
47. Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalizationof the Confrontation Clause: A Proposalfor a
ProsecutorialRestraintModel, 76 MiNN. L. REv. 557 (1992).
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Robert P Mosteller*
June 1
I will focus my comments in this Symposium on a question similar to that
examined by Professor Berger in her paper.' My question is how Regina v.
Kearley2 would be decided if the United States Supreme Court, rather than the
House of Lords, decided it. Before I examined Kearley from this perspective, I
tended to agree with the general thrust of Professor Park's paper that implied
assertions, while intellectually intriguing, are not a matter of great practical concern because the precedents developed to deal with real problems, like that in
Kearley, generally eschew extreme interpretations of the definition of hearsay,
reach sensible results, and provide guides for solving analogous problems.' My
concern is two-fold. First, the Supreme Court has shown remarkably little concern for bodies of lower court precedent such as those noted by Professor Park
under some versions of its inconsistent "plain meaning" analysis. Second, if the
Court takes the view that I believe it would - a "strong version" of the assertion-oriented approach as described by Professor Park - I do not believe that
relevancy analysis provides satisfactory protection against the types of dangers
most of the contributors to this Symposium believe are present in many implied
assertions.
The Huddleston case4 presents the type of result I fear. It is, I believe, correctly decided as a matter of interpretation of Rules 404(b) and 104(b) of the Federal
Rules of Evidence. At the same time, it swept aside a very substantial body of
lower court authority and common law tradition that treated other crimes' evidence as particularly dangerous and therefore required clear and convincing
proof of those other incidents and the defendant's involvement in them before
such evidence was admitted. 5 My reading of the results since Huddleston is that
the alternative approach of using Rule 403 to protect against weak proof of the
other incidents has not provided satisfactory protection against dangers of jury
misuse and over-valuing.
I fear a similar result for the definition of hearsay if the Supreme Court ever
examines a case like Kearley. As a consequence, I find myself ultimately in disagreement with Professor Park's position that redefinition of hearsay is not an
6
important practical concern.

* Professor of Law, Duke University School of Law. B.A. (History), University of North Carolina at Chapel
Hill, 1970; J.D., Yale Law School, 1975; Masters in Public Policy, Harvard University, 1975.
1. Margaret A. Berger, How Would or Should the Supreme Court Interpret the Definitions in Rule 801?, 16
Miss. C. L. REv. 13 (1995).
2. 2 App. Cas. 228 (H.L. Eng. 1992).
Own, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 125 (1995).
3. See Roger C. Park, The Definition of Hearsay: To Each Its
4. United States v. Huddleston, 485 U.S. 681 (1988).
5. Id.at 691.
6. Unfortunately, I am not sure that in the present political environment a legislative redefinition providing
the protections for criminal defendants that I believe are appropriate is realistic.
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Professor Berger has constructed an excellent argument from the Williamson7
and Tome 8 cases that if the Supreme Court were examining the Kearley case, it
should follow common law precedent and classify the statements and conduct of
the would-be purchasers as hearsay.9 She also argues that this approach has two
advantages. First, admission would be determined under the residual catch-all
exception where trustworthiness is determined in accordance with hearsay policy, and second, the Confrontation Clause would apply."
I believe, however, that the Supreme Court majority would not side with the
common law. I agree with Professor Berger that if the Court used the strong
form of "plain meaning" often espoused by Justice Scalia, it would employ dictionary definitions that would exclude from the definition of hearsay both
nonassertive nonverbal conduct and implied assertions from verbal conduct
where the words are not used for their literal meaning. The Court would, of
course, tell us that a truly extreme form of literalism is not required by Rule 801
- surely metaphorical speech ("the sky is on fire" to describe a sunset) remains
hearsay under the Rule. If it found any ambiguity in the words of Rule 801, I
believe the Court would consult the Advisory Committee's Note rather than the
common law. In deciding what Congress meant to enact, the Court would presume that the Advisory Committee's Note informed Congress about any ambiguity in the meaning of the rule's language rather than an amorphous and largely
unavailable body of common law precedent.
If I am correct that the Court would decide Kearley differently than the House
of Lords on the issue of hearsay definition, would relevance analysis provide the
additional protection that many of the contributors to this Symposium believe is
important? Specifically, would it provide a suitable way to decide between a
couple of calls regarding drugs and the large number of apparently very purposeful calls and visits involved in Kearley or would it draw the type of distinction
Professor Mueller believes is appropriate between performance and speech?11 In
extreme cases, I think the answer would be yes, but I do not believe the protection would be equivalent to the trustworthiness principle under the hearsay analysis. 2 However, general relevancy analysis is much too forgiving in my view (evi-

7. Williamson v. United States, 114 S. Ct. 2431 (1994).
8. Tome v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 696 (1995).
9. Berger, supranote 1, at 17-20.
10. Berger, supranote 1, at 19-20.
11. See Christopher B. Mueller, Incoming Drug Calls and Performative Words: They're Not Just Talking
About It, Baron Parke!, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 117 (1995).
12. Professor Swift's paper represents, in my judgment, a search for an effective bridging principle between
relevancy and hearsay analysis that would provide an alternative method of guaranteeing trustworthiness. See
Eleanor Swift, Relevancy and Hearsayin Regina v. Kearley, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 75 (1995).
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dence admitted unless prejudice substantially outweighs
probative value) to pro13
appropriate.
is
believe
I
that
protection
of
type
the
vide
While I disagree with Professor Berger on the result the Supreme Court would
reach, I very much approve of the basic premise of the alternative path to admission that she believes otherwise would and should operate generic trustworthiness analysis under the catch-all. 4 However, in order to guarantee this result
regardless of the Court's decision on the Rule 801 issue, why not write an explicit trustworthiness requirement into Rule 801 to govern the admissibility of
implied assertions? At the heart of much of the unease with wooden and extreme
applications of any definition of hearsay is, I believe, a concern that if the evidence is considered hearsay, it is subjected to trustworthiness analysis in some
form or the other,'" while if it is found to be nonhearsay, it escapes entirely that
analysis regardless of whether the definition applied eliminates any or all of the
hearsay dangers.
Finally, I would like to highlight an interesting point made by Professor
Seidelson regarding the Confrontation Clause 6 that could limit the ability of the
Court to employ a literal interpretation of Rule 801. He argues that while traditional nonhearsay is not within the protection of the Confrontation Clause,17 a
different result should be obtained if the definition is changed, and that if Rule
801 is interpreted to differ from Wright v. Tatham 8 regarding implied assertions,
it entails a change in the pre-Rules law adhered to in Tatham. 9 While I think he
is right,2" I doubt the Court will explicitly make this distinction. However, his

13. 1 think something more than standard relevancy protection is appropriate in criminal cases presenting
facts like Kearley. In Kearley, Lord Oliver used the term "reputation" at one point to describe evidence similar
to that used against Kearley. Regina v. Kearley, 2 App. Cas. 228, 268 (H.L. Eng. 1992). Reputation evidence
provides an interesting point of departure. It is admitted freely under the hearsay rule as an explicit exception.
See FED. R. EvID. 803(22). However, reputation has to pass over a separate hurdle in Rules 404 and 405, and in
criminal cases, it is excluded when offered against the defendant. The calls and visits in Kearley proved something more than that he had the reputation of being a drug dealer, but it also had some of the same dangers, and
evidence of this type in other cases might prove little more than reputation. I fear the application of general relevancy analysis will be too generous to the prosecution.
14. See FED. R. EVD. 804(b)(5).
15. I do not want to overstate the value of the trustworthiness requirement since, as we all know, some of the
traditional exceptions provide virtually none, and courts that are of a mind to do so can find trustworthiness in
almost any set of facts. I believe, however, that this type of analysis is more appropriately focused and generally more exacting than is basic relevancy analysis.
16. David E. Seidelson, Implied Assertions and FederalRule of Evidence 801: A Continuing Quandaryfor
FederalCourts, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 33 (1995).
17. See Tennessee v. Street, 471 U.S. 409, 414 (1985).
18. 112 Eng. Rep. 488 (K.B. 1837).
19. See Seidelson, supra note 16, at 38.
20. This is a variant of the argument that hearsay admitted under a "firmly rooted" exception satisfies the
Confrontation Clause. See Ohio v. Roberts, 448 U.S. 56 (1980). I have made a similar argument regarding the
substantial expansion of the definition of Statements for the Purpose of Medical Diagnosis or Treatment, Rule
803(4), to include statements made solely for the purpose of diagnosis as opposed to those made for treatment,
which were traditionally received. Robert P.Mosteller, Child Sexual Abuse and Statementsfor the Purpose of
MedicalDiagnosisor Treatment, 67 N.C. L. REv. 257, 288-90 (1989).
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argument could provide ammunition to those members of the Court who agree
with Professor Berger's argument that Rule 801 should not exclude implied
assertions from the hearsay definition.2 1

CraigR. Callen
June 13
Professor Mosteller's comment seems to raise two points relating to his predictions about the way that the Court might view the use of forms of the word
"assert" in Federal Rule 801.1 The first is best made with an illustration.
Suppose that the question of how X opened a door is relevant. Suppose further
that we have the out-of-court declarant's statement "She gave X her key and X
opened the door." Would, or should, the Court consider the statement hearsay to
show that X used the key given him to unlock the door? One might argue that
the plain meaning is that X did so, yet the words do not preclude the possibility
that someone gave X a large key to a city, and that he later used it to bash the
door down.' The words themselves radically underdetermine the meaning of the
sentence, even in ordinary discourse, unless one assumes that the speaker and
hearer each rely on knowledge of the world, and a number of other assumptions,
to interpret the sentence In the example I used, the declarant would not literally
convey that X used the key to unlock the door, so it would not be a direct assertion of the proposition. As to whether it is a positive statement that X used the
key to unlock the door, (another fairly common explanation of the meaning of
assertion), I would argue that it is, but not because the declaration literally says
that X did so. It is positive simply because, in the empirical world, we must rely
on common interpretive assumptions for any communication to take place.
Would (or should) the Court impose a meaning on the term "assert" that denies
so much of communicative reality as a literalist construction? It would seem to
be a very odd understanding of the idea of plain meaning to do so.
The second point I have relates to the possible argument Professor Mosteller
noted, which is that the Advisory Committee's Note adequately explained any

21. Arguably, one of the reasons the Court defined statements as narrowly as it did in Williamson v. United
States, 114 S. Ct. 2431 (1994), was to avoid having to make difficult distinctions for Confrontation Clause purposes between statements against interest within the traditional definition and statements like those in
Williamson made by suspects implicating both themselves and others, which were newly included by courts
after the enactment of the Federal Rules.

1.
Would
2.
3.

See Robert P. Mosteller, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How
(orShould) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. Ruv. 21 (1995).
The example is from JOHN R. SEARLE, THE CONSTRUCTION OF SOCIAL REALITY 131 (1995).
Id.
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change from the common law definition of hearsay to what I call in the Foreword
an "explicitness" test.4 In fact, it is very difficult to read the Note coherently as
an endorsement of a strict explicitness test.
I think I can show one difficulty in relatively little space. The Note to Rule
801 (a) says that "Nothing is an assertion unless intended to be one."' If assertions must be literal, or explicit, intent should not matter. A statement that might
be hearsay would either explicitly state the proposition for which it was offered
or not. One could argue that the "intended to be one" criterion was only instituted in order to exclude noncommunicative conduct from hearsay. That argument
might work if the Note to Rule 801 (a) did not say that considerations "similar" to
those governing the status of nonverbal conduct govern "verbal conduct that is
assertive but offered as a basis for inferring something other than the matter
asserted."6 If one intends to communicate a proposition by an utterance, that
utterance seems to be an assertion under the first sentence I quoted from Rule
801(a). So, the latter provision, referring to verbal conduct offered to show
"something other than the matter asserted" would seem more easily construed to
refer to, for example, a complaint of pain offered to show that the complainer
survived an accident rather than to the requests for drugs in a case such as
Regina v. Kearley.7 In other words, unless we are to assume that Congress was
familiar with battles among Wigmore, McCormick, and Morgan about the correct definition of hearsay, it seems doubtful that the Note to Rule 801(a) plainly
incorporates a literal statement test for distinctions between hearsay and nonhearsay.

Eileen A. Scallen*
July 19
Greetings to all participating in this innovative Symposium. I have enjoyed
reading your essays and comments on the Internet. Your efforts prove that
Regina v. Kearley1 was a superb choice as the basis for this discussion on the status of implied assertions; the case raises so many of the important questions
bothering evidence scholars not just in the United States or the United Kingdom,
but worldwide. Some are narrow questions: Should we ever characterize

4. See Mosteller, supra note 1, at 22.
5. FED. R. EVID. 801(a) advisory committee's note.
6. Id.
7. See 2 App. Cas. 228 (H.L. Eng. 1992).

* Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of Law.

1. 2 App. Cas. 228 (H.L. Eng. 1992).
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nonassertive nonverbal conduct as hearsay? Should we do so if the "conduct"
has any verbal component? Should we do so only if the verbal component
explicitly asserts a fact to be proved or should we exclude it if the verbal component fairly implies a fact that the proponent of the evidence is seeking to prove?
Some of the questions are a bit broader: Should we eliminate the hearsay rule?
Should we replace it with a modification, such as a rule balancing the relevance
(the probative strength) of the evidence against its dangers (its cumulative quality
given the other evidence in the case, or the likelihood that the trier of fact will
misevaluate or misuse it), or amend the rule to incorporate a trustworthiness
requirement for implied assertions?
And some of the questions grow wider still: Is some type of hearsay rule so
important to a fair trial that it rises to a Sixth Amendment Confrontation Clause
issue in the United States, or to some other right in countries with different systems of constitutional law? Who should make the rules of evidence - the
courts, the legislature, a committee of experts or some combination of these bodies? Moreover, once the rules have been made, how should judges interpret
them? Can any exclusionary evidence rules be acceptable to a public terrified of
criminals and unable or unwilling to indulge in the presumption of innocence
(that is, if evidence law requires the implied assertions considered in Kearley to
be excluded, would a lay person, say as Lord Griffith says, " 'Then the law is an
ass.' "2)?
Kearley, as discussed in this Symposium, raises all of these questions. I would
like to bring to this discussion consideration of "practical reasoning" in evidence
law, for it helps me understand the problems raised by implied assertions.
Practical reasoning, in my view, is a process of argumentation in which the interpreter (here, a judge) justifies a decision about the meaning of a statute or constitutional text using all of the sources of meaning in a given legal community (text,
precedent, legislative history, consequences of interpretations, etc.). The judge is
driven by the need to be candid and complete in exploring these sources, a need
that stems from the judiciary's educative role. Practical reasoning is an approach
to interpretation based on sensitivity to the communication process, although
grounded more in classical rhetorical theory of the sophists and Aristotle than the
more modem linguistic approach taken by Craig Callen.' I have fleshed out the
theoretical aspects of practical reasoning elsewhere, 4 but let me apply it to the
questions raised here.
The narrowest questions are about the meaning of the rule on implied assertion. The opinions in Kearley demonstrate, to no one's particular surprise, that
the common law approach does not produce a determinate result. It is especially
difficult to reconcile the outcome in Kearley (excluding the telephone calls and

2. Id. at 237.
3. See Craig R. Callen, Forewordto the First Virtual Forum: Wallace Stevens, Blackbirdsand the Hearsay
Rule, 16 Miss. C. L. RE. 1 (1995).
4. Eileen A. Scallen, ClassicalRhetoric, PracticalReasoning, and the Law of Evidence, 44 Am.U. L. REv.
1717, 1747-59 (1995).
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visits as implied assertions)' with Ratten v. Regina,' in which the fearful cries of
a woman were held to be properly admitted as nonhearsay to refute the defendant's claim that he had accidentally shot her.7 However, it is amusing to note
that Lord Bridge looked in Kearley to the United States for the enlightened view,
declaring that "[i]n the federal courts of the United States the law is made clear
by the Federal Rules of Evidence."8 Professors Berger and Seidelson, as well as
others, demonstrate that this is hardly the case.'
Professors Berger and Seidelson demonstrate that the text of Rule 801 is
ambiguous when it comes to implied assertions." They examine the Advisory
Committee's Note to Rule 801, concluding that the Advisory Committee intended to exclude the type of implied assertions at issue in Kearley, because of the
reduced danger of fabrication or insincerity, while ignoring the potential dangers
of perception, memory, and communication. 1 However, both Professors Berger
and Seidelson, while respectful of the Advisory Committee's approach, are not
slaves to this kind of "legislative history."' 2 They make convincing arguments
that such implied assertions should be hearsay under Rule 801.13 Professor
Berger shows that the United States Supreme Court has been ambivalent about
the role of the Advisory Committee's Notes in interpreting the Federal Rules,
sometimes relying on them and sometimes not.' 4 In this situation, she would opt
for a reading of Rule 801 that is consistent with the common law precedents,
which are concerned with all of the hearsay dangers, not just the danger of insincerity. 5 She also places the implied assertion problem in its larger context in
evidence law - arguing that the implied assertion, although hearsay, might still
be admissible under the residual exception if it were sufficiently trustworthy and
necessary, and in criminal cases, the Confrontation Clause would apply to provide additional protection.'"
Professor Seidelson makes similar arguments about the ambiguity of Rule 801
and the Advisory Committee's position, but he is more explicit about the conflicting United States precedents on implied assertions. 7 He also adds Congress
into the equation, arguing from its silence that Congress would not have intended18
to effect such a large change in the common law without clearly saying so.

5. Kearley, 2 App. Cas. at 228.
6. 1972 App. Cas. 378 (H.L. Eng.).
7. Id.
8. Kearley, 2 App. Cas. at 247.
9. See Margaret A. Berger, How Would or Should the Supreme Court Interpretthe Definitions in Rule 801?,
16 Miss. C. L. REv. 13 (1995); David E. Seidelson, Implied Assertions and Federal Rule of Evidence 801: A
Continuing Quandaryfor FederalCourts, 16 Miss. C. L. Rev. 33 (1995).
10. Berger, supra note 9, at 13; Seidelson, supra note 9, at 33.
11. Berger, supra note 9, at 14-15; Seidelson, supra note 9, at 34.
12. Berger, supra note 9, at 18; Seidelson, supra note 9, at 35.
13. Berger, supra note 9, at 18; Seidelson, supra note 9, at 46-47.
14. Berger, supra note 9, at 16-18.
15. Berger, supra note 9, at 19.
16. Berger, supra note 9, at 19-20.
17. Seidelson, supra note 9, at 33.
18. Seidelson, supra note 9, at 52.
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This kind of statutory interpretation argument is made often, and it actually raises the kind of problems we are discussing with implied assertions - can we
draw reliable inferences about the speaker's intent when it is not expressed
directly and the speaker is not subject to cross-examination? Professor Seidelson
notes a way out through another argumentative strategy - focusing on the burden of proof.19 He quotes Justice Kennedy's use of this strategy in Tome v.
United States, "[a] party contending that legislative action changed settled law
has the burden of showing that the legislature intended such change."20
Resorting to this strategy in hard cases will always result in the status quo, just as
the Advisory Committee's decision to give the objecting party the burden of
proof that a statement was "intended" as an assertion will result in a finding that
the statement is nonhearsay in close cases. Using this strategy to construe Rule
801 thus results in a finding that the common law on implied assertions survived
the creation of the Federal Rules of Evidence.
Professors Berger and Seidelson do not take the easy way out. They do not
declare that the text of the rule has a "plain meaning," as our current United
States Supreme Court often does, nor do they try to show that the application of
logic to precedent "demands" a certain outcome, as some of the Lords in Kearley
did, as Professor Allen points out.21 Putting Professor Berger's and Professor
Seidelson's arguments together provides a solid basis for the meaning of Rule
801 in borderline cases. To use another evidence analogy: resorting to the text
of an evidence rule or a "controlling" precedent alone for the meaning of a rule
is like allowing a jury to consider only direct evidence of a crime. Maybe this
will do in the vast majority of "open and shut" cases, but it would needlessly
hamstring us in hard cases. The process of practical reasoning is the process of
putting together the best circumstantial evidence you have - pointing out the
consistencies and trying to explain or discredit the inconsistencies.
Professor Stein made a valid point about discretionary rules, ones that require
balancing; they add expense and uncertainty to the trial process.2 2 I think the
practical reasoning approach is susceptible to this critique. However, I agree
with Professor Allen that certainty and predictability are often illusory in the
adversarial setting. We wish for them, but we do not always get our wish.
Professor Park is correct that the majority of cases will not pose this kind of
interpretative difficulty for courts.24 But in the hard cases, those that result in
Supreme Court opinions, it seems that the Justices would do better to engage in
the kind of analysis described here than in spending their time just looking things
up in the dictionary.

19. Seidelson, supra note 9, at 51-52.
20. Seidelson, supra note 9, at 51-52 (quoting Tome v. United States, 115 S. Ct. 696, 703 (1995) (citations
omitted)).
21. Ronald J. Allen, Rules, Logic, and Judgment, 16 MIss. C. L. REV. 61, 62 (1995).
22. Alex Stein, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How Would (or
Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 93 (1995) (responding to Ronald J.
Allen).
23. Allen, supra note 21, at 72.
24. Roger C. Park, The Definition of Hearsay: To Each Its Own, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 125, 129 (1995).
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On first reading Kearley, the confrontation problem stood out to me clearly,
although the Lords do not really discuss it explicitly. Professor Nancy King was
kind enough to refer to my interpretation of the Confrontation Clause problem."
While that article does discuss the societal dimension of confrontation, I argued
for a practical reasoning approach to the Confrontation Clause, requiring consideration of all of its dimensions in a given situation - the reliability (also called
the evidentiary) dimension, the procedural dimension (discussed by Professors
Berger and Kirst)26 as well as the societal dimension."
How would this work in the Kearley situation? The reliability dimension is a
problem; while Professor Allen and some of the Lords believe the defendant is
clearly or "obviously" guilty,28 I like to put myself in the shoes of the accused's
lawyer - are there weaknesses or avenues that I would like to explore on crossexamination? I certainly would here. As some have suggested, I would have
liked to ask whether the declarants were operating on the basis of rumor they had
heard about "Chippie." This theory does not seem implausible to me (I do note
that one of the opinions makes reference to a previous drug transaction with
Chippie, but that raises a separate problem of character evidence as well as reliability issues).
This reliability problem is compounded by the procedural dimension. The witnesses against the accused in Kearley were police officers who intercepted the
calls and visitors. 9 Like Lord Ackner in Kearley, I am not as confident in the
integrity of the British law enforcement community after the IRA terrorist cases
in which evidence was apparently coerced, manufactured and orchestrated by the
government.30 In theory, cross-examination of the police officers on the stand
should expose any insincerity. However, despite my desire to engage them in
cross-examination, I am not confident that it is a cure-all. Indeed, as a series in
the New York Times last year revealed, perjury among New York police officers is
so common that they have a term for it themselves: "testilying. 3 1 The threat of
cross-examination has not stopped these officers or exposed their insincerity.
Professor Berger's solution of requiring that the police officers tape the calls is
creative, 32 but given the high-tech capacity to alter audio and video tapes, I am
not comfortable allowing the police officer (or fellow officers) to lay the foundation for the authenticity of the tape. I think her solution of requiring the prosecution to produce the declarant or show why they could not after a reasonable effort

25. See Nancy J. King, Electronic Discussion in The Reach and Reason of the Hearsay Rule: How Would
(or Should) the Supreme Court Decide the Kearley Case?, 16 Miss. C. L. REv. 100, 102 (1995) (citing Eileen
A. Scallen, ConstitutionalDimensions of HearsayReform: Toward a Three-Dimensional Confrontation Clause,
76 MINN. L. REv. 623 (1992)).
26 See Margaret A. Berger, The Deconstitutionalizationof the Confrontation Clause: A Proposalfor a
ProsecutorialRestraint Model, 76 MiN. L. REv. 557, 572-78 (1992); Roger W. Kirst, The Procedural
Dimension of the ConfrontationDoctrine,66 MINN.L. REv. 485 (1987).
27. Eileen A. Scallen, ConstitutionalDimensions of Hearsay Reform: Toward a Three-Dimensional
Confrontation Clause, 76 MINN.L. REv. 623, 635-636 (1992).
28. Allen, supra note 21, at 71.

29. Regina v. Kearley, 2 App. Cas. 228, 236 (H.L. Eng. 1992).
30. Id. at 258.
31. See Joe Sexton, New York Police Often Lie Under Oath Report Says, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 22, 1994, at Al.

32. Berger, supra note 9, at 20.
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is the better solution to the procedural dimension of confrontation.3" In Kearley,
the prosecution made no apparent effort to produce the declarants or to explain
why they could not produce the declarants.34
I have argued that in addition to reliability and procedural functions, confrontation has a societal dimension. The societal dimension is concerned with respect
in the relationships between the accused and the individual witness-accuser, and
the accused and the state as accuser. I help my students see this dimension by
asking them to put themselves in the shoes of an accused. Then, I ask them
whether, if they were sure that the testimony was accurate or that the witness
would be able to testify convincingly, although lying or mistaken (in short, if reliability was not an issue), and if they were sure that the government had not manufactured the evidence against them (no procedural concern), they would still
want to face their accuser. Virtually all of them say yes, but they have a hard
time explaining why, except to resort to the maxim "if you're going to say that
about me, say it to my face." This maxim expresses the desire for respect in the
dual relationships the accused has with an individual accuser and the state. I
argue, and as I believe Professor Toni Massaro has argued,35 that this respect is
essential to the perception of our system as fair or just. Without an explanation
of why the prosecution was unable or unwilling to call the declarants in Kearley,
the societal dimension of confrontation is not satisfied.
Also note that the practical reasoning approach does not call for an absolute
right to confrontation. We have always dispensed with confrontation where there
is an adequate showing of necessity (for example, dying declarations). I argued
in my earlier article that we might not provide confrontation in some child abuse
cases.3" However, in those cases, we ought to require the prosecution to prove
the necessity for dispensing with confrontation, which provides additional assurance that the procedural concerns are unwarranted, and provides the respect
demanded by the societal dimension. Moreover, as others have pointed out, the
right to confrontation can be waived by the defendant's attempt to misuse confrontation. A defendant's attempt to intimidate or threaten an accuser results in
forfeiture of that right. Nevertheless, I see no reason to dispense with confrontation in Kearley.

Professor Friedman and I had an interesting private exchange via "snail mail" a
while ago about the dimensions of confrontation. He argued there, if memory
serves me, that reliability is a due process concern, rather than a confrontation
concern. He convinced me at the time, but now I hbld fast to my original position, albeit with a provocative twist. I do not think that the reliability, procedural,
and societal dimensions can be separated in practice, although they can be analytically and artificially severed for discussion. In other words, the same confrontation that serves societal values, also provides reassurance that the govern-

33.
34.
35.
36.

See Berger, supra note 9, at 20.
Regina v. Kearley, 2 App. Cas. 228, 236 (H.L. Eng. 1992).
Toni M. Massaro, The Dignity Value of Face-to-FaceConfrontations, 40 FLA. L. REv. 863, 910 (1988).
Scallen, supra note 27, at 653. *
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ment has not manufactured the evidence and provides additional basis for testing
the reliability of the testimony. It is not necessary to segregate the reliability,
procedural, and societal dimensions, assigning reliability to the Due Process
Clauses and leaving the other dimensions to the Confrontation Clause. I agree
that the reliability dimension is embodied in due process, but here is the twist:
perhaps the other dimensions (procedural and societal) are part of due process as
well. This might mean, as I believe Professor Ed Imwinkelried has already suggested,37 that there is some type of right to confrontation in civil cases as a part
of the Due Process Clauses of the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments.
I have been disturbed by the ease with which some commentators would
resolve the problem of implied assertions by eliminating the hearsay rule in civil
cases. There is a large category of actions that are civil proceedings, but that can
have criminal overtones, such as civil Racketeering Influenced and Corrupt
Organizations Act,3" civil securities fraud,39 civil rights claims under section
1983,40 and immigration cases. Some degree of confrontation seems especially
important in these cases, where "trial by affidavit" may not result in actual
imprisonment, but can have devastating financial consequences (in the form of
compensatory and punitive damages), produce social stigma, and, in immigration
cases, result in the loss of a different kind of liberty. I know this injects an additional level of discretion and balancing into civil cases, which Professor Stein
and others would deplore, but the question is not whether there will be additional
expense, but whether the additional expense is justified. In an ordinary civil
case, the hearsay rule (perhaps purged of some of its more unwarranted exceptions, such as excited utterances), might provide enough of a balance of reliability and necessity to pass any constitutional objection. In the category of "quasicriminal" cases, however, heightened scrutiny of the three dimensions of confrontation is warranted, although the procedural dimension will collapse into the
reliability dimension where the state is not a party. (While any manufactured
evidence violates the reliability dimension, I read Professors Berger and Kirst as
expressing increased revulsion when the powers of the state are used to fabricate
41
or alter evidence.)
After reading Kearley, I am again grateful for our written Bill of Rights, which
would have provided an explicit additional basis for the Lords' decision in that
case. However, it would be a pity if our written Constitution leads us to fixate on
one of its sections (the Sixth Amendment) and refuse to explore whether similar
values are embodied in other sections (the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments).

37. Edward J. Imwinkelried, The Constitutionalizationof Hearsay: The Extent to Which the Fifth and Sixth
Amendments Permit orRequire the Liberalizationof the Hearsay Rules, 76 MINN. L. REv. 521, 539 (1992).
38. 18 U.S.C. §§ 1961-1968 (1988).
39. 15 U.S.C. §§ 77(k)-(m) (1988).
40. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1988).
41. See Berger, supra note 26, at 606-07; Kirst, supra note 26, at 492-94.

